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ABSTRACT
Adams, Monti. “Wash Your Cows to Remove Radioactive Fallout: Government Efforts
to Prepare the Population of the United States for a Nuclear Attack.” Master’s
Thesis, Fort Hays State University, 2014.
This thesis evaluates the history of the Civil Defense programs from World War
II through the Kennedy Administration. There were various government agencies tasked
with Civil Defense, preparing the civilian department for war activities. The urban,
suburban, and rural populations received different messages from these various agencies.
There were specific marketing campaigns aimed at the rural and agricultural groups to
convince them to prepare to survive a nuclear attack. The government needed this key
demographic to survive and continue to provide food to the survivors of any nuclear
attack. Rural populations and agricultural producers were important due to their ability to
provide the crucial food supply necessary to the surviving populace. Without a reliable
and safe food supply, the remaining people would not be able to rebuild all that had been
destroyed during the nuclear attack. In addition, the rural population needed to survive to
play host to those who survived the initial nuclear attacks. Survival plans for urban and
suburban populations focused on separate messages than those for rural and agricultural
areas because the latter had to factor livestock and crop protection into their survival
plans. For those in urban or suburban locals, their only concern was to protect themselves
and their families.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper will examine the buildup of the Civil Defense program between 1950
and 1965. This time period is significant because it immediately follows the Soviet
Union’s successful detonation of a nuclear weapon in 1949 and the stockpile of nuclear
weapons by both the United States and the Soviet Union began growing. In addition, the
Cuban Missile Crisis occurred in October of 1962, a crucial time in world history. This
was arguably the most active period in the history of the Civil Defense program. The
general public faced a growing awareness that a worldwide nuclear war was ever more
possible.
One particular segment of the United States’ population was specifically targeted
by the federal government. The government wanted to ensure that the rural population
survived for several reasons. First, rural populations and agricultural producers provided
food for the rest of the population. An adequate and safe food supply would be necessary
for any survivors of a nuclear attack. Another reason to help the rural population prepare
for an attack is that the vast majority of rural areas would experience little direct damage
from a nuclear attack. This meant that rural areas of the country would be required to
play host to those who survived the initial assault. Urban areas and military
establishments were primary targets in every planning scenario. Any survivors of attacks
would need to be evacuated to areas that experienced little damage, rural areas.
The United States Civil Defense Program first began during World War II when
President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Civilian Defense in 1941. Its name
and mission changed several times over the years and at times its necessity was
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questioned until the Soviet Union detonated its own nuclear bomb in 1949, thereby
eliminating the United States’ monopoly on this dangerous weapon. Fearful Americans
demanded that their government help them plan for this new threat. Harry S. Truman’s
administration created the Federal Civil Defense Administration in 1950, in response to
local and state governments’ demands for help from the federal government to face the
possibility of a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union.
Traditionally, American citizens, unlike their European counterparts, had
supported military efforts from a safe distance. During both World War I and World War
II Americans had grown Victory Gardens, gathered scrap metal, and lived with ration
booklets that controlled how much sugar, butter, gasoline, and countless other products
they could buy, all to help win the war and keep it from advancing to our shores.
However, when President Truman deliberately targeted Japanese civilians with the two
atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, the rules of war
changed forever. The introduction of this ferocious weapon into the world’s arsenal
drastically altered the way future conflicts were viewed. From this point on, civilians
would find themselves directly in the crosshairs of all manner of destructive weapons and
countries planned accordingly.
The Office of Civilian Defense (OCD) was a subsection of the Office of
Emergency Planning created by President Franklin D. Roosevelt on May 20, 1941. This
transitioned into the National Security Resource Board (NSRB) following World War II.
The NSRB published informational material aimed at helping local governments with
civil defense training. Most of their publications were ineffectual and local officials
became frustrated by the NSRB advice to “lick your wounds, nurse your injuries, and
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die.”1 In 1949, the Soviet Union tested its own atomic bomb and the United States
government realized it was no longer alone in the nuclear club. In 1950, the NSRB
became the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) when President Harry Truman
signed the Federal Civil Defense Act. The FCDA continued providing government
sponsored material to reassure the general population that even though the United States’
sworn enemy now had nuclear capabilities, it was all going to be fine. For instance, in
Survival under Atomic Attack citizens are reassured that “There is one important thing
you can do to lessen your chances of injury by blast: Fall flat on your face.”2 The
information provided to the general public offered little scientific or technical
information. The advice to fall flat preceded the claim that more than half the injuries of a
nuclear bomb explosion are due to being thrown around or being hit by flying objects.
The FCDA was responsible for civil defense preparations in the United States and its
territories for the decade spanning from January 1951 through June 1961. President John
F. Kennedy engaged in a game of chicken with Russian Premier Nikita Khrushchev and
Prime Minister of Cuba, Fidel Castro during the Cuban missile crisis in October of 1962,
and in doing so brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war. Prior to that, President
Kennedy transferred the duties of the FCDA to the Department of Defense in 1961. He
“issued an Executive Order which assigned major civil defense responsibilities to the
Secretary of Defense.”3 This led to the creation of the Office of Civil Defense headed by
an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Civil Defense).

1
2

Kenneth Rose, One Nation Underground (New York: New York University Press, 2001), 23.

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Civil Defense, Survival under Atomic Attack, Film. (1951;
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense Office of Civil Defense, 2001.), ONLINE
https://archive.org/details/Survival1951.
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Throughout its various incarnations, the office responsible for Civil Defense
preparations in the civilian population continued to produce pamphlets, films, coloring
books, and newspaper serials aimed at convincing the American population that a nuclear
war was survivable and winnable. While some of this material was general in nature,
much was targeted to a specific audience. There were three major demographics targeted
by the program materials, notably the urban population, the suburban population, and the
rural or agricultural population. There were subsets of the larger groups targeted, for
instance women and children. However, the main groupings were by locations because
urban women would prepare differently than agricultural women would.
There has been a significant amount of study done on the subject of Civil Defense
and its many facets. This era is of particular interest to those who grew up in the shadow
of the mushroom cloud. However, there has been little research done on the rural aspect
of Civil Defense. There was a proliferation of academic articles and books published
about all things atomic around the time that the children of the fifties and sixties reached
the appropriate age to launch their independent research. Jo Anne Brown looked at civil
defense in the public school systems in her 1988 study. She found that overwhelmingly
children were first taught about nuclear war and survival in the classroom and then took
that knowledge home to their parents.4 Elaine Tyler May5 and Susan Stoudinger
Northcutt6 examined Civil Defense and gender in 1988 and 1999 respectively. They both

3

U.S. Department of Defense Office of Civil Defense, Personal and Family Survival (Washington
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1966), 8-9.
4

JoAnne Brown, “A Is for Atom, B is for Bomb: Civil Defense in American Public Education,
1948-1963,” The Journal of American History 75, no. 1 (1988): 68-90.
5

Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic
Books, 1988).
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analyzed the introduction of a war mentality into the traditionally domestic safe zone of
the home. They determined that the United States government recruited women to help
with preparedness efforts. The government knew that for the civilian population to have
any hope of survival in large numbers, the women needed to be involved. An effort was
made to convince women that unless they prepared their families to survive a nuclear
attack, they were not doing their jobs as efficient caretakers. Neither author specifically
discussed any issues specific to rural women, Tyler May does have a paragraph in her
book about the increase in demand for rural real estate as a result of fears that urban
centers will be bombed. Kristina Zarlengo studied the transformation of civilians from
bystanders to targets. Her article claimed that the United States changed the rules of
engagement when it dropped the two atomic bombs on Japanese civilian centers, thereby
placing United States civilians directly in the sights of future opponents.7 Kenneth Rose
studied the fallout shelter and the culture that surrounded that phenomenon.8 Tom
Vanderbilt’s book Survival City: Adventures among the Ruins of Atomic America looked
at, among other things, fallout shelters as well; including one that doubled as an
elementary school in Artesia, New Mexico. Located in a small, rural, town south of
Roswell, it was the only elementary school that contained a fully functioning morgue.9
When evaluating the effect of fallout shelters on American society, it is tempting to think

6

Susan Stoudinger Northcutt, “Women and the Bomb: Domestication of the Atomic Bomb in the
United States,” International Social Science Review 74, no. ¾ (1999): 129-139.
7

Kristine Zarlengo, “Civilian Threat, the Suburban Citadel, and Atomic Age American Women,”
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 24, no. 4 (1999) :925-958.
8

Kenneth D. Rose, One Nation Underground: The Fallout Shelter in American Culture (New
York: New York University Press, 2001).
9

Tom Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America (New York:
Princeton Architectural Press, 2002).
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that all of America is riddled with backyard shelters. However, using Illinois’ Cook
County, the county that houses Chicago as an example, as of November 19, 1961 “only
19 people out of a population of 3,500,000 had applied for a permit to build a home
shelter.”10
Edward Zuckerman’s book contained detailed accounts of the continuity of
business plans of several large corporations and their blueprints for how to get their
company back up and running after a nuclear attack on the United States. Many of these
companies kept a backup of all their important corporate records in a safe and secure
location underground, usually a former salt mine in the region near their corporate
headquarters.11 The Defense Production Act in 1950 established the importance of
creating plans to protect key businesses in case of nuclear attack. Companies, especially
in communication, manufacturing, and energy production, were encouraged by the
FCDA to have “continuity of business” plans. These plans contained information of the
line of succession, the list of people that had the legal power to run the company in the
event key executives were killed in a nuclear attack. Much like the “continuity plan” for
the Federal government, these plans took the guesswork out of disaster planning.
Standard Oil went as far as providing sixteen emergency shelters around the New York
area, stocked with preissued $25 and $100 checks to help them meet payroll following an
attack.12 The business community was another specialized group targeted by the FCDA.
The communication, manufacturing, and energy production businesses would play

10

Walter Karp, “When Bunkers Last in the Backyard Bloom’d,” American Heritage, 31 (1980):

11

Edward Zuckerman, The Day after World War III (New York: The Viking Press, 1984).
Ibid., 275.
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significant roles in the rebuilding of America following a nuclear attack and as such
efforts should be made to protect them.
Laura McEnaney suggested that the government’s Civil Defense office marketed
its agenda primarily to suburban homeowners who were largely white.13 This may have
been true with popular media like Life magazine and Popular Science. However, the
suburban homeowner was not the only sector targeted. If you look beyond mass media
and survival information provided through the post office to all postal customers, you
find a significant amount of information specifically for the agricultural community. The
government needed this key demographic to survive and continue to provide food to the
survivors of any nuclear attack. The government, through various federal agencies,
designed specific marketing campaigns aimed at the rural and agricultural groups to
convince them to prepare to survive a nuclear attack. Rural populations and agricultural
producers were important due to their ability to provide the crucial food supply necessary
to the surviving populace. Without a reliable and safe food supply, the remaining people
would not be able to rebuild all that had been destroyed during the nuclear attack.
The authors listed above comprise a very small number of those that have written
on the subject of Civil Defense in the United States.14 A wide range of subcategories
within the subject of Civil Defense have been examined. However, the Civil Defense
programs aimed at the rural and agricultural populations have been virtually ignored.
This paper attempts to rectify the gap in the historiography of this subject.

13

Laura McEnanaey, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the
Fifties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
14

See Supplemental Bibliography for additional authors and their works.
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This thesis will examine numerous ways that Civil Defense officials aggressively
targeted the agricultural and rural population. The country needed this population, the
knowledge they held, and the products that they provided. The government did use some
different tactics to reach the rural and agricultural populations; they distributed pamphlets
through local extension agents and created fallout shelter plans that incorporated barns
for livestock. However, some of the avenues pursued were very similar, popular media
was one tool used to reach audiences. For the general population, Civil Defense officials
published information in Life magazine and Good Housekeeping; for the rural and
agricultural population, they chose Successful Farming and and regional publications like
Nebraska Farmer to carry the necessary information to their target audience. When the
Office of Civil Defense commissioned public service announcements (PSA), they had
some directed toward urban and suburban populations: Duck and Cover and Family
Fallout Shelters. They also made one expressly for the rural and agricultural population:
Your Livestock Can Survive Fallout from Nuclear Attack. The latter was available as a
pamphlet as was Defense Against Radioactive Fallout on the Farm. While it may seem,
from a cursory examination of popular media, that all the Civil Defense efforts were
focused on the suburban middle class, a closer examination of material from the time
period yields a different view of the situation. The government exerted a significant
amount of energy trying to prepare the rural and agricultural populations to survive a
nuclear attack; the government used different venues to reach different populations.
There were some items produced by the Office of Civil Defense that were mass marketed
to the general population. However, other items were strategically targeted toward the
rural and agricultural communities.

9

CIVIL DEFENSE FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH THE KENNEDY
ADMINISTRATION
The concept of civilian defense began to surface during the first World War.
German forces bombed villages and towns in Poland, Belgium, France, and England in
an attempt to defeat the Allies. These attacks did not extract a high death toll but did have
a devastating psychological effect on the civilian population. With no organized civilian
defense efforts, it was every person for themselves. Many in London sought out the
subway tunnels underneath their city for a safe hiding place. While the German bombers
dropped bombs on major cities throughout England, the major target was London. The
total civilian dead from the bombings reached forty thousand; twenty thousand of those
came from London.1 Because the conflict was contained in Europe, Americans felt safe
from an attack on their homeland during World War I and therefore did not initially put
any efforts into preparing the civilian population. Eventually the United States
government moved to address the issue of the war as it affected their country. Created in
1916, the Council of National Defense (CND) worked to garner support for the war
effort. The Council included many members of the President’s cabinet, including the
Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, War, and Navy. When the United
States entered the war, Americans no longer felt as secure as they once had. Germany
was waging unrestricted submarine warfare throughout the Atlantic, increasing fears of
an attack on the Eastern seaboard. In addition, Germany tried to entice Mexico into
attacking the United States, raising fears of an invasion from the south. With increased
threats, the Council’s efforts increased and states were asked to form their own councils

1

“World War II: London in Color,” LIFE magazine, 2014. accessed April 1, 2014,
http://life.time.com/history/world-war-ii-london-in-color/#1, 1.

10

to aid the war efforts of the country. Following the war, the CND ceased operations by
June, 1921 as civil defense efforts were thought unnecessary.2
The next time a need for civilian defense was deemed necessary was in 1933
when President Franklin D. Roosevelt commissioned the National Emergency Council
(NEC). By 1933 it was apparent that Europe was becoming unstable. Adolph Hitler and
his National Socialist German Workers’ Party, more commonly referred to as the Nazi
party, had been stirring up trouble since the 1930 elections when they became the second
leading party in the government. Named Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, Hitler
and his Nazis began a campaign that eventually caused World War II.3 The end result of
the Nazis’ efforts led to the deaths of nearly fifty million civilians. The number may be
significantly higher as there is no accurate record of civilian deaths in China and that
number has been estimated as high as fifty million in that country alone.4 The NEC, like
the previous councils before it, consisted of cabinet members as well as President
Roosevelt and many agency heads. Roosevelt brought the Council of National Defense
back to life in 1940 when Europe became engulfed in warfare to begin World War II.
During World War II the tactic of bombing civilians that had started in World
War I continued. This brought increased fear of a bombing on United States soil. New
York mayor, Fiorello La Guardia, exhorted President Roosevelt to spearhead some sort of
federal effort to protect the civilian population of the United States. According to La

2

Homeland Security, Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National
Preparedness Efforts (Washington D.C.: United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 4-5.
3

David Goldfield et al., Twentieth-Century America: A Social and Political History, 2nd ed.
(Boston: Pearson Education, Inc. , 2013), 241-243.
4

“By the Numbers: World-Wide Deaths,” The National World War II Museum, accessed April 1,
2014, http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-thenumbers/world-wide-deaths.html, 1.
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Guardia, “up to this war and never in our history, has the civilian population been
exposed to attack. The new technique of war has created the necessity for developing
new techniques of civilian defense.” 5 LaGuardia and others feared a direct bombing
attack on the United States, particularly the coasts. Plane spotters were trained to pick out
the differences between Allied and Axis bombers from a distance, using the silhouette of
the plane. Bombings were considered so definitive the United States Army Air Force
created the Ground Observer Corps in 1941, prior to the bombing in Pearl Harbor.
Trained spotters had books that “contained both photographs and silhouette drawings of
all known warplanes of U.S., British, German, Italian, and Japanese air forces.”6
President Roosevelt relied on advice from his wife Eleanor and her associate
Florence Kerr, to create the Office of Civil Defense (OCD). Inspired by the work of her
friend, Lady Stella Reading who served as the director of Women’s Voluntary Services
for Civil Defense in England, Mrs. Roosevelt urged her husband to take advantage of the
labor pool of women on the home front. President Roosevelt asked Florence Kerr, a
woman in his administration as the head of the Works Progress Administration
Community Service Projects, to lead the charge. Kerr and Eleanor Roosevelt collaborated
on a report for the President titled “American Social Defense Organization.” The
President entrusted the two women to put the framework in place for the Office of
Civilian Defense (OCD). President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order in May of 1941

5

Elwyn A. Mauck, Civilian Defense in the United States: 1940-1945 (Unpublished manuscript by
the Historical Officer of the Office of Civilian Defense, 1946), 55. Cited in Homeland Security, Civil
Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of National Preparedness Efforts (Washington D.C.,
United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006), 5.
6
Sam Moore, “When Farmers Were Spotters: Farming the Homefront During World War II,”
Farm Collector, June 2010, accessed March 25, 2014, http://www.farmcollector.com/farm-life/farmingthe-homefront-during-world-war-ii.aspx#axzz2xGuwX0Rc, 1.
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and selected LaGuardia to lead the new office.7 Kerr and the first lady pushed the
president to consider expanding the scope of the new office. Some of the President’s
advisors wanted a more conservative mandate for the new office. However, President
Roosevelt saw an opportunity to meet more of the country’s needs and authorized the
OCD “to meet a wide array of needs, including the protection of the civilian population,
the maintenance of morale, and the promotion of volunteer involvement in defense.”8 The
President viewed this as another opportunity to expand his social agenda. Many in the
Washington establishment and the rest of the country felt that the Roosevelts’ plans of
incorporating social services with Civil Defense planning overstepped the original
military preparatory mission of the program. A vocal segment of those in opposition to
the “softer” side of Civil Defense planning felt that the whole program should be under
the purview of the Department of War and not a civilian group.9
At this time governors and other local officials reinstated the state and
neighborhood chapters that had been active under the Council of National Defense.
LaGuardia resisted the effort to change the focus of the OCD from that of a defensive
organization. Rather than dilute the mission of civil defense, he wanted to concentrate on
creating neighborhood militias. However, Eleanor Roosevelt strongly supported the many
social welfare goals of the OCD including “morale maintenance, promotion of volunteer

7

Department of History George Washington University, “Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt Glossary:
Office of Civilian Defense,” The Eleanor Roosevelt Papers Project, accessed December 7, 2013,
http://www.gwu.edu/~erpapers/teachinger/glossary/office-civilian-defense.crm, 1.
8

Ibid.
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involvement, and nutrition and physical education.”10 She emerged from the background,
where she stayed to prevent her presence being a drag on the new office, and joined with
LaGuardia so that all of the objectives of the original mandate could be implemented.
The criticism of the agency came from all sides. Those who did not like the social
welfare aspects decried the overreach of government into people’s lives. Others believed
that the civilian defense portion would be better served under the Department of War.
President Roosevelt ignored all the criticisms, including all those who felt that the OCD
should be mothballed after the end of World War II.
With the end of World War II came the belief that the threat of an attack on the
United States’ homeland was minimal. The head of OCD, James Landis, supported this
school of thought and pressed for the closure of his own agency. After all, troops were
returning home from Europe, having defeated Hitler and the Nazi regime, and Japan
would soon meet the same fate. The United States was victorious and safe from further
invasion. Civil defense was no longer necessary. With Roosevelt’s death on April 12,
1945, Vice-President Harry Truman became the new President. The Truman years were
marked by conflicting reports and disagreement between his advisors. Truman sided with
Landis and others who felt the OCD had outlived its usefulness. He took office having
only been Vice-President for a total of eighty-two days and knowing nothing about the
secret nuclear weapons program. On June 4, 1945 he signed an Executive Order to end
the OCD and by June 30, 1945 it was officially decommissioned.
The entire world’s ideas of safety and rules of warfare changed dramatically with
the introduction of the atomic bomb. Following the United States decision to drop two
atomic bombs on Japan, the idea of war and civilian defense shifted. A report published
10

Department of History, “Teaching Eleanor Roosevelt,” 1.
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in 1946 by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey admitted that during World War II
conventional bombing of civilians in Japan and Germany had been effective strategies.
As one way to reduce the impact of civilian bombings in the United States in a future
conflict, civilian defense plans should be adopted. The group advised the creation of
plans to aid in the mobilization of civilians from urban areas to safer areas and shelters
for those unable to evacuate the possible targeted areas.11
An alternate report in 1947 by the War Department’s Civil Defense Board
recommended the federal government stay out of civil defense planning. This report
stated that local officials were best suited to know the requirements of protecting their
communities. The role of the federal government was to offer resources to help local
leaders best protect the civilians in their location.
In 1947 the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was created by Congress
in the same legislation that unleashed the Central Intelligence Agency on the world. The
National Security Act of 1947 established the NSRB and charged it with developing
“programs for the effective use in time of war of the Nation’s natural and industrial
resources for military and civilian needs, for the maintenance and stabilization of the
civilian economy in time of war, and for the adjustment of such economy to war needs
and conditions.”12 With World War I, World War II, and the onset of the Cold War
taking place within the span of thirty years, the United States government recognized that
a procedure needed to be in place that would allow them to switch from a peace time
economy to a war time economy quickly and efficiently. In addition, developing a plan to

11
12

Homeland Security, 6.

“Text of the National Security Act of 1947,” United States Congress ONLINE, accessed
December 1, 2013, http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/nsaact1947.pdf, 1.
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ensure the safety and continuity of the food supply was crucial. The nation’s agricultural
assets needed to be protected in case of nuclear attack to provide sustenance to survivors
that would rebuild the country.
Civil defense became a priority of the Truman administration when the
geopolitical differences between the United States and the Soviet Union ratcheted up at
the end of the 1940s. When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon on August
29, 1949, the United States’ confidence shattered.13 The United States had been certain
that it would take significantly longer for the Soviet Union to develop an atomic weapon.
The possibility of a worldwide atomic war suddenly became all too real.14
President Truman reevaluated the need for a civilian defense system, in part
prompted by a study on civil defense operations and the establishment of a civil defense
unit in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Recommended were several things
including that a new agency for civil defense be created under the auspices of the OSD.
In addition, this new office should be a permanent installation to help the United States
prepare for the new realities of living in the atomic age. Truman acted on these
recommendations and created the Office of Civil Defense and Planning (OCDP) March
27, 1948.
The United States’ first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, headed the newly
created OCDP, but his term as head was characterized by major disagreements with

13

Jason Hall, ed., “Soviet Atomic Bomb Test,” The Cold War Museum, ONLINE, accessed
December 1, 2013, http://www.coldwar.org/articles/40s/soviet_atomic_bomb_test.asp, 1.
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ONLINE, accessed March 25, 2014,
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President Truman about virtually every issue, including budget levels of the military and
the size of the military that would be needed to combat the ongoing threat posed by the
Soviet Union. In early 1949 Truman forced Forrestal to resign from both the OCDP and
the Department of the Defense, but not before Forrestal had commissioned yet another
committee to study the issue of Civil Defense. Russell Hopley, the president of
Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, headed this new committee.15 Mr. Hopley
selected a committee to work with and the group produced a three hundred page report
that proposed the framework for a national civil defense organization. The committee
recommended the federal government provide more of a support role and that the bulk of
the preparations should be handled by local and regional leaders. The groups opposed to
the recommendations included Congressional members objecting to the increased costs
involved and civilian groups who feared possible over-reaching by the government and
increased military control over civilian life.16
It is at this point when the National Safety Resources Board (NSRB) was
reinvigorated. Rather than establishing a civil defense office under the control of the
OSD, President Truman gave responsibility of civil defense for the country to the NSRB.
This effectively silenced those that feared a military intrusion into their lives. However,
the NSRB received neither adequate authority nor material backing to effectively do its
job. Consequently, the NSRB moved from agency to agency, never remaining under the
control of any one agency for very long. First, the NSRB was transferred to the control of
the Department of Defense. Then, it moved to the Executive Office of the President.
15

Jerry N. Hess, interview by Felix E. Larkin, September 18, 1972 and October 23, 1972,
transcript ONLINE, accessed November 12, 2013, Truman Library
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/larkin.htm, 1.
16

Homeland Security, 7.

17

Finally, the NSRB found itself assigned to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM).
All of these transfers occurred between March 3, 1949 and December 1, 1950. During
this period of transition, the NSRB produced the first booklet to help the general public
prepare for a nuclear war. In October 1950, the NSRB released the booklet titled Survival
Under Atomic Attack.17 According to the booklet, “The civil defense program for this
country must be in constant readiness because for the first time in 136 years an enemy
has the power to attack our cities in strong force, and for the first time in our history that
attack may come suddenly, with little or no warning.” The information provided to the
general public through the early efforts of NSRB provided superficial information-little
technical or scientific information. The advice provided in the booklet compares
radioactivity from nuclear bombs to that received from x-rays and sunburn.18
The Soviet Union’s nuclear capabilities were a surprise to the United States. They
did not know in advance about the Soviet Union’s first nuclear testing in 1949 and they
did not know the extent of any other nuclear capabilities. Uncertainty drove the panic of
the 1950s, unlike the 1960s conflicts over the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
The anxiety felt in the 1950s was the reason behind the nuclear tensions between the
United States and the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the preemptive
strike as a viable solution to defeating the Soviet Union in 1950. The idea of being able to
disarm the Soviet Union before a war even began proved popular with both the military
and civilians.19
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With the establishment of the ODM in 1950 and the successful testing of an
atomic weapon by the Soviet Union in 1949, a new era dawned. The general public as
well as local government leaders clamored for a definitive plan to help them prepare for
an entirely too real possibility of an atomic attack by the Soviet Union. Congress
responded in December 1950 by passing the Federal Civil Defense Act thereby
establishing the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA).
The FCDA produced a flurry of pamphlets and educational material aimed at
helping many facets of the American population survive an atomic attack. The agency
published numerous fallout shelter designs and instructions on how to build them. In
addition, material instructing the public how to deal with nuclear fallout was published in
virtually every newspaper around the country. Children were introduced to Bert, an
animated turtle who showed them the proper way to protect themselves in case they were
near a nuclear explosion. An entire generation grew up watching Bert the turtle in the
infamous Duck and Cover public service announcement produced by Ray Maurer and
Anthony Rizzo in 1951, at the request of the FCDA.20 Bert was seen in a cartoon,
coloring book, and comic book for decades. Bert marketing was one of several efforts
made to indoctrinate children in the United States in the value of nuclear safety. The
National Education Association’s Commission on Safety Education, school officials from
Massachusetts to Los Angeles, and the FCDA’s Division of Education and Training
supported these efforts. The general sentiment at the time was that if the children could
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be convinced of the necessity of being ready in an instant to react to a nuclear attack, they
would bring their parents into the fold.21
Women became another target audience. The FCDA created a campaign aimed at
women that evoked images of earlier times titled “Grandma’s Pantry.”22 In addition to
the pamphlet with this name produced by the FCDA, newspapers around the country
published excerpts and encouraged their readers to stock up with a three day supply of
food and water for their families. As the St. Petersburg Times stated, “The modern
housewife, who can hop in her car and drive to the nearest super market to pick up the
ingredients for the evening meal at a moment’s notice, does not regard her pantry with
the same respect as grandma did.”23 The article listed the FCDA recommended list of
three day supplies for one person. The categories listed were canned milk with the
recommendation of fourteen to fifteen ounces of either dry or canned evaporated milk per
person, canned meat with the recommended amount of twelve ounces, canned soups with
the recommended amount of twelve ounces, canned vegetables with the recommended
amount of twelve to sixteen ounces; following these items was an extensive list of
miscellaneous items and their recommended amounts.24 All the wife needed to do was
take the list, multiply the quantity by the number of people in her family, and purchase
the recommended amounts.
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Women were also urged to decorate their home fallout shelters and provide a
homey place for their families to ride out an atomic attack. A pictorial essay from Life
magazine showed a family in their shelter. The picture featured the parents and three
children seated-the parents in lawn chairs and children on the carpeted floor. Their
survival supplies, cupboard doors open to show rows of canned goods and first-aid
supplies surrounded them. According to the accompanying article, each member of the
family had a role to play in their successful survival of an attack. The father was
responsible for the tools necessary for survival and security; the mother’s role was to
stock and rotate the supplies her family needed. Each of the children had a specific duty
within the shelter; “Daughter Charlene is in charge of bedding for the folding cots and
fold-up bunks. Son Claude looks after the candles, flashlights, transistor radio and a fresh
supply of batteries. Daughter Judy is the shelter librarian with a stock of books and games
to help pass the time.”25 The FCDA worked tirelessly to promote the idea of the
survivability of an atomic attack, if only one were adequately prepared.
The notion that an atomic attack by the Soviet Union was survivable took a hit in
1953. The Soviet Union successfully tested their first hydrogen nuclear bomb. The
destruction capabilities of this new type of bomb made surviving in a home built shelter
impossible. At the unbelievable size of 400 Kilotons of TNT, the hydrogen bomb was
twenty six times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The Soviet Union created a succession of ever more powerful hydrogen bombs, resulting
in the creation and detonation of the world’s largest thermonuclear device.26 Due to the
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power of these new weapons, the FCDA began recommending the strategy of mass
evacuations from urban centers rather than the shelter model.
This new strategy became popular with President Dwight Eisenhower, who had
always held the position that state and local leaders should be responsible for civil
defense rather than the Federal government. The efforts to promote mass evacuations
gained increasing support until the United States government blasted the Bikini Atoll
with a colossal thermonuclear bomb named Bravo. The wind shifted following detonation
and radioactive fallout dispersed over seven thousand square miles and affected a
Japanese fishing crew and the test personnel. When the public found out about the
incident and the resulting illnesses as a result of the radioactive fallout, there was an
increased demand for shelters capable of protecting citizens from drifting fallout that
would follow any nuclear attack.27
The Eisenhower administration still supported the idea of mass evacuations, in
part due to the efforts underway to expand the federal highway system. The head of the
FCDA wanted Congress to divert money from the highway program to federal civil
defense. Once again the Civil Defense agenda lost out to a more popular one and the
funding levels demonstrated that lack of support. The President was determined to
complete a nationwide highway system and was unwilling to divert funding to the other
programs, including the FCDA.28
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The mass evacuation program limped along for a few years until Congressman
Chester Holifield of California convened a House Committee on Government Operations
in 1956 to look into the effectiveness of the FCDA. Holifield, elected in 1942, served on
the House Subcommittee on Legislation and Military Operations, was chairman of the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a number of times, and was one of the few in either
chamber of Congress to protest and vote against the Emergency Detention Act.29 He was
informed on the subjects of the military and nuclear science. In addition, he was well
respected in Washington D.C. and not afraid to speak his mind, even if it went against
popular opinion.
The findings of the “Holifield Hearings” were that the federal government had
focused its efforts on evacuation to the exclusion of other solutions. There were at least
two reasons for the tunnel vision of the FCDA. The first being that the evacuation plans
were vastly cheaper than building enough public shelters to adequately house citizens. By
encouraging evacuation, the costs were shifted to individuals and local governments
rather than the federal government. The second reason was that Eisenhower was pouring
billions of dollars into creating a national highway system; the Eisenhower administration
used the idea of mass evacuations as a benefit of having a national highway system.
These funds allowed homeowners to get low cost loans to convert their basements into
shelters or build fallout shelters in the backyard. According to one source, the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) had several programs that would help homeowners
29
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finance a shelter, including one that allowed a homeowner to borrow up to $3500 for a
maximum of five years. There were a few restrictions on the money including that the
shelter needed to meet the “standards of the office of Civil Defense Mobilization and the
FHA, who would make the inspections of construction.”30 The article also suggests that
people create dual purpose spaces that can be used by the family everyday but serve as a
fallout shelter when needed in an emergency; suggestions for these rooms include dark
rooms, dens, and laundry rooms.31
The “Holifield Hearings” took place in 1956 and for the next decade the push was
toward home fallout shelters in suburban and rural areas and public shelters in urban
areas, with mass evacuation as an alternative plan. Several other reports followed that
confirmed the importance of civil defense to act as a deterrent in this new type of
warfare. The first was a report released in 1957 and produced by the Gaither Committee,
convened at the request of President Eisenhower. This report concluded that based on
current military readiness, the U.S. was unable to effectively defend itself from a surprise
attack by the Soviet Union. This report recommended that fallout shelters be provided a
measure of deterrence. The belief being that if enough people survived the initial attack, a
substantial counter-attack could be mounted. Next came the Rockefeller Report that had,
among others, Henry Kissinger on its panel, and the second a report published by the
RAND Corporation. Kissinger recommended that Civil Defense would be an effective
part of a serious effort towards deterrent and the RAND report stated much the same
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opinion.32 The federal government believed that civil defense was a part of an effective
strategy of deterrence, but did not want to pay for it. The government wanted to pour
more money into military capabilities and civil defense detracted from that. Particularly
during the Eisenhower administration, the Secretary of State and military leaders did not
support the shelter idea out of fear of decreasing the military’s budget. They felt the
money would be better spent on retaliatory efforts rather than protecting civilians. Even
Eisenhower himself did not support the shelter efforts, under his watch the FCDA did
little but inform the public about the benefit of home shelters and count existing shelters.
Eisenhower decommissioned the FCDA and introduced the Office of Civil and Defense
Mobilization.33
Eisenhower may not have wanted to invest in shelters for the general public, but
during his tenure he had a huge bunker commissioned for use by members of Congress
and their staffs. The concept of “continuity of government” was the motivating factor
behind these shelters. “Continuity of government” plans detail the line of succession for
the federal government in case multiple members of the Executive Branch are killed in
any kind of disaster, although they were specifically planning for a nuclear attack from
the 1950s through the present day. The Presidential Line of Succession Act of 1947
changed the protocol for determining who would take over for the President in the
circumstance that he was unable or unavailable to carry out his duties. An earlier version
had removed the Senate president pro tem and Speaker of the House from the line of
succession. This version replaced them, however put the Speaker ahead of the president
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pro tem.34 Later “continuity of government” plans were developed for every major
branch of government.
To help provide for the survival of as many of the administration in Washington
D.C., a number of nuclear shelters were built within one hour’s drive of the D.C.
metropolitan area. This distance was chosen to provide an easy commute in times of
disaster, but allow enough distance from the city to remove it from any immediate blast
damage. Built into a mountain underneath an existing luxury hotel, the Greenbrier Hotel,
in White Sulphur Springs, Virginia, the Congressional bunker would be the postapocalyptic home for eleven hundred people. This figure included one hundred senators,
four hundred and thirty five representatives, five hundred staffers, and surprisingly no
family members.35 President Truman commissioned and built a similar shelter in 1950.
Site R or the Raven Rock Mountain Complex was built into the Catoctin Mountains on
the edge of Pennsylvania and six miles from Camp David. Officially designated the
“Alternate Joint Communications Center,” Site R was designed to be a backup location
for the Pentagon and military leaders in case of nuclear war.36 In addition, there is Mount
Weather located on five hundred acres in Virginia. This facility’s actual origins remain a
mystery. All that is known is that it was built sometime in the 1950s and started as a
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presidential hideaway in case of nuclear war. This location is officially home to the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).37
When you consider the array of bunkers in the Washington D.C. area, the safety
of government officials seemed assured. For the Truman and Eisenhower administrations
and essentially every administration since then, the average American’s safety and
security during a nuclear attack was not a priority, they were basically on their own The
government’s continuity plans only include protecting themselves, not necessarily their
constituents. Any planning to ensure the safety of civilians was left up to the local
authorities or to the individuals themselves.
The importance of civil defense changed dramatically when President Kennedy
took office in January 1961. Kennedy took office during a time of heightened tensions
between the Soviet Union and the United States, primarily due to the actions of Kennedy
and his administration. During the Presidential campaign of 1960, Kennedy had
deliberately exaggerated the disparity in missiles between the Soviet Union and the
United States. He had used this as a campaign issue against his opponent. He had
deliberately exaggerated the Soviet missile technology, as well as the capabilities of their
aircraft to carry them to the United States homeland. In addition, he underestimated the
number and capability of the United States’ arsenal. His misinformation was intentional
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because in July of 1960, in the midst of his campaign, both he and his running mate,
Lyndon Johnson, were briefed on many intelligence issues including Soviet missile
capabilities.38 Kennedy’s public claims of ignorance reinforced Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev’s view of him as young and inexperienced. When he and Khrushchev met
for a summit at Vienna in June of 1961, Khrushchev’s opinion remained unchanged. The
goal had been to establish a basis for trust between the two governments, instead when
Kennedy returned to Washington D.C. he did so knowing that Khrushchev’s distrust was
growing.39 Then in August of 1961, literally overnight, the Soviet Union built a wall
separating the two sides of Berlin. The wall was an effort to try to prevent the
approximately two thousand East Germans crossing into West Berlin daily. The people
leaving included scientists, skilled workers, and intellectuals.40 In addition, President
Kennedy and his brother Robert, the newly appointed Attorney General of the United
States, had an obsession with the revolutionary leader of Cuba, Fidel Castro, who would
later become Prime Minister of Cuba. They feared the revolutionary zeal he brought to
Cuba would spread. This preoccupation resulted in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
orchestrating over a dozen assassination attempts on Castro’s life, numerous efforts to
foment a counter revolution in Cuba, a mock invasion of a nearby island under the thinly
disguised codename “Ostrac,” and even one try to convince the Cuban population that
they were witnessing the second coming of Jesus Christ.41
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The barrage of attempts on Prime Minister Castro’s life added to all the other
operations caused him to fear a United States military invasion of his nation. Castro
turned to the Soviet Union and Nikita Khrushchev in his time of need. He repeatedly
requested help from Khrushchev and clearly stated he feared imminent attack by the
United States. In the following excerpt from a letter that Castro wrote to Khrushchev on
October 26, 1962, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, he says, “Given the analysis
of the situation and the reports that have reached us, [I] consider an attack to be almost
imminent—within the next 24 to 72 hours.”42 By this time the Soviet Union had
delivered forty three thousand troops and ninety eight tactical nuclear warheads to Cuba.
In addition, they had mid-range missiles in Cuba that could reach Washington D.C. and
New York, which the United States intelligence community did not know about. The
United States believed not only that they were going to be able to keep Soviet missiles
from reaching Cuba, but that they had the right to. The Soviet Union had delivered them
and set them up prior to the United States detecting them. The United States intelligence
agencies were so busy planning assassination attempts on Castro, they missed thousands
of Soviet troops and nearly one hundred nuclear warheads being delivered to Cuba.
The underlying problem in the whole scenario was that President Kennedy,
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, and the CIA failed to recognize that Cuba was a
separate entity from the United States. They continued to treat Cuba like a protectorate,
with no right to do what it wanted to do. When threatened by the United States, Castro
felt he had no choice but to try to defend himself and his country. Castro contacted the
41
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Soviet Union out of fear, born out of the multiple attacks on his life and his nation by the
United States. In a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy at the height of the Cuban Missile
Crisis, Khrushchev told Kennedy that he will authorize the dismantling of the missiles in
Cuba. He asked for one thing in return, a promise from Kennedy not to attack Cuba.43
The period from 1960 to 1963 was the most active time period for civil defense.
President Kennedy wrote an open letter to the public that was published in Life magazine
on September 15, 1961. In this letter he states that “nuclear weapons and the possibility
of nuclear war are facts of life we cannot ignore today.”44 In addition, he encouraged
citizens to build fallout shelters, “I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of
this issue of Life. The security of our country and the peace of the world are the
objectives of our policy.”45 The article that followed contained plans for various fallout
shelters and pictorials of typical families building and stocking their own fallout shelters.
The final article of the series was a “[r]undown of things to remember in case attack
should come.” It included information about the difference in a Civil Defense attack for
an alert versus one for a warning to take cover. In the case of an alert the Civil Defense
siren would send out a three to five minute blast and in the case of a warning the siren
would send out a three minute period of short blasts or a wailing siren. In addition, the
article outlined the steps that would happen if a nuclear blast occurred in your area
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including the three stages of an attack: the flash, the shockwave, and the fallout.46 The
cover of the magazine featured a man in a radiation suit to reinforce the message.
Under the Kennedy administration the Office of Civil Defense and Mobilization
split into the Office of Emergency Planning (OEP) and the Office of Civil Defense
(OCD) by Executive Order on July 20, 1961. The OEP became part of the Executive
Office and was responsible for non-military emergency preparation and civil defense.
The OCD became part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of
Defense. The OCD was responsible for civil defense at the national level, especially the
fallout shelter program.47
Thanks in large part to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the cause of civil defense
jumped to the forefront. President Kennedy received all of the $200 million he asked for
from Congress to address the issue of finding and stocking public shelters. The goal
being to provide room for as many individuals as possible in the current public shelter
locations.
The massive shift in policy can be attributed to the idea of that in order to win a
nuclear war with the Soviet Union as many citizens as possible had to survive in the
United States to continue the American way of life. This was in direct contrast to the
previous administrations of Truman and Eisenhower. These administrations had fully
supported the buildup of the military and the building of secret shelters for government
use only. The Kennedy administration’s new emphasis included businesses,
manufacturing companies, and private citizens. It was incumbent on everyone to prepare
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themselves to survive a nuclear war so that the United States could return to “normal” as
quickly as possible. To this end, companies like Shell Oil Company and AT&T had
continuity plans in place and bunker locations for executives to hide out and continue to
operate their businesses in the event of a nuclear attack. States and local communities
devised emergency plans to inform their citizens of the proper actions to take in the event
of a nuclear attack. Private citizens built fallout shelters in their backyards and basements
to ensure their families safety in the event of a nuclear attack. Everyone hoped that if the
Soviet Union believed that the majority of United States citizens could survive a nuclear
attack the Soviet Union would hesitate to launch their nuclear weapons if total
destruction of the United States was not assured. The deterrent factor that had been
mentioned in many previous reports and recommendations finally became a factor in the
Cold War.
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URBAN AND SUBURBAN SURVIVAL PLANS
The factors considered in strategic survival planning varied by community size
and location. Metropolitan locations or urban centers had different needs than suburban
areas did and rural and agricultural areas were completely different than either of the
previous two areas. Those involved in Civil Defense planning had to consider all of these
constituent populations when designing programs.
According to the United States Census Bureau in 1960, an urban community is
one that has a population of two thousand five hundred or more. There was no official
delineation for suburban.1 A more helpful definition appears on the Census Bureau’s
current website. The updated definition of an urbanized area is one that is larger than fifty
thousand people. The qualification for an urban cluster might be a good descriptor for a
suburban area, a community that is larger than two thousand five hundred people and less
than fifty thousand people.2
The focus of both the urban and suburban community survival plans was to
protect the civilian populations that lived in the specific areas. These areas made
attractive targets because of the population density. Bombs aimed at cities would cause
more damage through sheer numbers alone. Until the mid-1960s when missile silos
started being built in rural areas, the biggest threat faced by rural populations was drifting
radioactive fallout. The different threats faced by the various communities were one of
the reasons for a change in survival strategy for those in rural and agricultural
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communities. Another reason the urban and suburban plans focused on separate messages
than those for rural and agricultural areas is that the latter had to factor livestock and crop
protection into their survival plans. For those in urban or suburban locals, their only
concern was to protect themselves and their families. Rural and agricultural residents had
more extensive responsibilities. They needed to guarantee that enough of their livestock
and crops survived to continue providing for the hungry survivors who emerged from
their urban public shelters or suburban basement shelters when the all clear was signaled.
During the Roosevelt administration the plan for the urban population was for the
government to build and equip community shelters. However, Congress was reluctant to
allocate adequate funds that would have been necessary to sufficiently protect even a
fraction of the civilian population. During the Truman administration there was a shift to
local control of Civil Defense efforts. The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA)
led efforts to help local communities identify public shelters, provide supplies to
stockpile for future use, and establish a uniform warning system to be used in case of
attack.
During the Eisenhower administration efforts shifted to focus on evacuation. The
new interstate highway system, Eisenhower’s signature effort, was touted as an efficient
way to transfer the population from targeted locations to less populated, safer areas.
Another issue that factored into Eisenhower’s support of evacuation over shelters was the
increasing size of the nuclear bombs. This more powerful bomb that the Soviet Union
detonated in 1953 created the belief that cities would be unlivable if attacked with a
hydrogen bomb, whether people were in shelters or not. The only possible way to protect
a city’s population was to make sure it was not there during the attack.
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However, one of the biggest problems with evacuation versus shelter was the
warning time involved. Once the onus for protection of civilians shifted to local
governments, many states created formal survival plans trying to consider all
contingencies that were possible in their specific location following an attack. The
information in the following passages came from the State of Kansas Operational
Survival Plans. The plan included a Basic Plan and several additions specific to various
cities around the state that could expect to be affected if Kansas were the target of an
attack on the United States. The whole plan was printed and distributed around the state
to local Civil Defense Agencies in 1958.
The formal survival plans had contingencies for several different Warning
conditions including: Strategic Warning (8 hours or more), Tactical Warning (1/2 to 8
hours), Attack Imminent and/or No Warning (1/2 hour or less). The Warning conditions
began with an announcement of a Strategic Warning, this meant that the President or the
Congress proclaimed a state of emergency, usually in response to growing international
problems. With a Strategic Warning, the State Warning System started broadcasting
emergency warnings. The public was subject to voluntary evacuation at this stage. If
conditions progressed, the next step was a Tactical Warning. A Tactical Warning came
from the FCDA National Warning System Headquarters. A warning such as this would
be in response to military intelligence indicating a likely attack within a matter of hours.
The public located in a Target Area faced mandatory evacuation. The next stage would
be Attack Imminent. Again, this designation came from the FCDA Headquarters. This
warning would be issued upon visual verification of enemy forces or destructive devices.
At this stage all the public could do would be seek shelter where they could and ride out
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the storm.3 Bomb size and destructive power increased and improved missile technology
allowed for multiple bombs to be launched from stealth submarines located off either of
the United States’ coasts instead of the previous long-distance bomber planes. Warning
times decreased and the challenge became how to evacuate an entire city with less than
thirty minutes? In 1950 the total urban population numbered just over ninety million, and
by 1960 that same population had grown to over one hundred thirteen million. In the
event of a nuclear attack on the United States tens of millions of people would need to be
evacuated to “Reception Areas.”4 Reception Areas were less populated areas designated
to play host to refugees from urban centers and other targeted areas like military bases in
the event of nuclear war. For the Kansas City, Kansas metropolitan area as an example,
the 1960 population of 475,539 people needed to be moved to the smaller communities
further out in the state of Kansas, like Emporia, Atchison, and Doniphan to name a few.5
If even one third of the cities were attacked in the initial wave, that is still over
thirty million people that need to be evacuated. If it is a school day, how do parents
collect their children and leave the city in the specified time? As many city residents,
particularly on the east coast, do not own a private vehicle how does the city coordinate
public transport for evacuation? All of these questions and many more needed to be
addressed in a formal survival plan. The evacuation plan for Kansas City, Kansas reads in
part:
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It is expected that with the sounding of sirens and the employment of other
warning media indicating a potential attack, individual and mob panic will
be an unwanted but highly probable result. The degree to which hysteria
prevails will to a large extent by dependent upon each individual’s
awareness of what positive action to take in accordance with established
plans. The providing of designated evacuation routes from Target Areas in
itself is insufficient to secure maximum survival of human life. Additional
provision must be made for the direction of evacuees and for other basic
needs, both within the Target Area and along the routes leading to safety.
From any point within the Target Area sufficient routes have been laid out
to allow all persons the possibility of escape. Designated routes provide
the most direct and expeditious egress from the danger area since they
utilize surfaced roads traversing radially away from the points of danger
and have no serious intersections.6
The plan mentioned that Kansas City area residents were to use residential cars and
trucks as their primary means of evacuation and expressly rules out the use of trains and
planes as being impractical. In fact, the plan indicates that in case of an attack all train
traffic must give the right of way to vehicular traffic to allow better traffic flow. Every
neighborhood was assigned a number and had a corresponding primary evacuation route,
alternate evacuation route, and transfer route. If a person found themselves in an area
other than their home neighborhood when the alarms went off they were to evacuate
according to their present location, not their home location. Evacuation operations were
to be managed by the police force including reserves and auxiliaries as needed to
maintain control of the operation and had absolute and final authority over everyone
within the Target Area.7
One of the major reasons for bringing civil defense training into the nation’s
schools was to alleviate anxiety in the first generation of children faced with nuclear war.
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The introduction of civil defense training programs including the animated Bert the
Turtle, dog tags for identification, and duck and cover drills. Duck and cover drills
involved children diving under their desks or against a wall and covering the back of their
necks to protect it from radiation, all on a teacher’s command or with the sound of an airraid siren. Bert the Turtle was an animated character who demonstrated the duck and
cover technique in a cartoon, coloring book, and comic book and emphasized that when
the attack came to remain calm. In addition, schools in large cities started issuing dog
tags to their students to enable authorities to identify bodies in case of a nuclear attack.
However, that purpose was never publicized and many preferred to believe that they were
to help in identifying lost children and aiding in reuniting them with their families. A side
market emerged for those companies that provided metal bead chain necklaces for use
with the dog tags issued by the armed forces. The chain companies started advertising
their product in the backs of comic books and school magazines.8 Those that came of age
during the 1950s and 1960s have a different view of safety than previous generations.
They grew up with duck and cover drills, Bert the Turtle, and the threat of a nuclear
cloud permanently hanging over their world.
Suburban communities were close enough to heavily populated urban areas that
were likely to be targeted. But far enough away that the government figures informed
people they would be safe. For instance, a five megaton surface nuclear blast would cause
a one-half mile crater at the site of the explosion. The resulting damage emerges from the
center in outward in concentric circles. The first circle encompasses three miles in all
directions of the blast and would kill everyone within the circle. The next two circles
continue out to seven miles from the center and the damage varies from heavy to
8
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moderate. From seven to nine miles out the expected damage is light and beyond nine
miles there should be no damage. The largest risk outside the blast range would be from
radioactive fallout.9
Home fallout shelters were the solution stressed in virtually all of the newly
formed suburban communities in the 1960s. The only exceptions to this plan were those
communities that fell within Target Areas, due to proximity to a military target or other
high risk target. Many of the suburban communities were in fact “Support Areas” or
areas that would play host to those evacuating at the first hint of a possible attack. The
government expected suburban residents to not only save themselves, but also all of the
refugees that would be coming their way from nearby cities.
The efforts to convince suburbanites to build a fallout shelter in their basement or
backyard took many forms. The federal government produced pamphlets and booklets
that gave detailed instructions for building both permanent and improvised fallout
shelters. Many local entities from state civil defense agencies to city newspapers
reprinted these materials and distributed them to their local populations. One such
example of this is a serial printing of Survival under Atomic Attack cut out of the local
newspaper by one family and pinned together.10 The collected information was stored in
the family copy of Personal and Family Survival.11 The two items were printed over a
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decade apart, but someone in the family that resided at 423 Box 72 in Imperial, Nebraska
felt strongly enough about the issue of Civil Defense and preparedness to keep the
information safe and together. When found at an auction, the book and clippings were
with miscellaneous first-aid items. They were likely the remnants of the original owners
civil defense preparations.
Another pamphlet was Family Shelter Designs published by the OCD and
Department of Defense. This concise work contained eight different designs for variously
styled fallout shelters. Also included were material lists, construction instructions, basic
blueprints, and technical information for each of the eight designs. The plans ranged from
a basic lean-to shelter in a basement with sand as the shielding material, to the more
elaborate brick masonry shelter that was designed to be built at the same time as a new
house.12 It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many home shelters were built. Many
people converted a space they currently had into a secondary use as a fallout shelter.
Rather than build a new single use room, they turned a corner of their basement or their
storm cellar to serve as a temporary haven in case of nuclear attack. In addition, it is
impossible to know how many secretly built fallout shelters in their basements or
backyards without telling anyone, including their neighbors. These people were preparing
to save their families, but they did not want the entire neighborhood showing up on their
doorstep wanting in at the first sign of danger. As Father L. C. McHugh, associate editor
of the Jesuit magazine America, said, “To love one’s neighbor as thyself, he argued, was
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undoubtedly a ‘heroic’ Christian virtue, but it was not a Christian duty. Indeed, it was
‘misguided charity’ not to shoot a neighbor trying to invade one’s jam-packed shelter.”13
Another way that suburban residents were exhorted to prepare for a possible
nuclear attack was through popular media. The biggest of these was the Life magazine
issue dated September 15, 1961. The cover featured a man in a radiation suit along with
the headline of, “How you can SURVIVE FALLOUT.” A personal appeal from President
John F. Kennedy started off the thirteen page pictorial essay.14 In this letter from the
President he outlines his argument for building shelters, both public and private. His last
paragraph includes this plea:
I urge you to read and consider seriously the contents of this issue of LIFE. The
security of our country and the peace of the world are the objectives of our policy.
But in these dangerous days when both these objectives are threatened we must
prepare for all eventualities. The ability to survive coupled with the will to do so
therefore are essential to our country.15
This simple message came weeks after the Soviet Union erected the Berlin Wall and one
year before the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy had been in office less than one
year and he felt compelled to write an open letter to the general public and have it
published in a popular news magazine. The President wanted to impress on people how
important the issue of nuclear preparedness was.
At the bottom of the page is the following series of sentences, “You could be
among the 97% to survive if you follow advice on these pages … How to build shelters
…Where to hide in cities … What to do during an attack.”16 With one exception, all of
13

Walter Karp, “When Bunkers Last in the Backyard Bloom’d,” American Heritage 31 (1980):

15

John F. Kennedy, “A Message to You from the President,” LIFE magazine, September 15,

92.

1961, 95.
16

“Fallout Shelters,” LIFE magazine, September 15, 1961, 95.

41

the pictures and plans that follow apply exclusively to those who live in the suburbs. The
plans assume that one owns a single family home with a basement or a big backyard that
one could use to build a fallout shelter in. One picture shows the “typical” teenage girl
using her family’s fallout shelter as her private clubhouse, with a cola in one hand and a
telephone handset in the other.17 There was not a minority or apartment dweller among
those pictured in the photo essay. This particular message was targeted to white middle
class suburbanites, although it was ostensibly in a nationwide magazine. Published
approximately one year before the Cuban missile crisis, this edition of LIFE magazine
was timely as tensions in the Cold War had ratcheted up. In addition, with the President
making the argument that it was every citizen’s duty to his/her country to survive an
attack, the message was pervasive.
In addition to preparing personal fallout shelters for their families, those living in
the suburbs needed to prepare to play host to those evacuated out of Target Areas. Even
though there was a big push for family fallout shelters, President Kennedy commissioned
a survey of all public spaces that would be suitable for use as a public shelter in times of
nuclear attack. In cities, public shelters would be used for those that could not evacuate.
In suburban areas, public shelters would house evacuees from cities. As reported in the
1962 fiscal year report signed by Robert S. McNamara, more than fifty five million
shelter spaces had been identified by the end of fiscal year through that survey.18 This
meant that someone in the government realized that with mass evacuations came refuges
that needed somewhere to go; the Support Areas would be that somewhere. Every Target
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Area was assigned at least one Support Area to funnel its people to. Some cities needed
more than one Support Area to handle all of the potential evacuees. Other Target Areas
needed contingency Support Areas in case their primary ones were unreachable due to
unexpected circumstances like additional bombs or shifting winds carrying fallout.
An example of the plans for a Support Area can be found in the Kansas Survival
Plan Project. There are a number of Target Areas in Kansas, including Kansas City,
Wichita, Topeka, Junction City, and Salina. Junction City and Salina made the Target
Area list due to their proximity to military targets rather than what the cities actually
contained. Each of these Target Areas have a Support Area, although some Support
Areas are shared by more than one Target Area. While not considered primary Target
Areas, there are a number of surrounding counties that were likely to be too damaged to
be Support Areas either. These counties included Leavenworth, Jackson, Jefferson, and
Riley. Support Area one acts as the host area for refugees from both the Topeka and
Kansas City Target Areas.19 Those tasked with figuring out the specifics of life after a
nuclear attack made a meticulous survey of the assets contained within Support Area one
and how they might best be utilized. Each city within the Support Area is named and the
useful industrial facilities in the city are listed. For example,
Emporia has a number of small food processors, including one meat packing
company, four dairies, three bakeries, and one poultry house. It has only one
producer of animal feed. In the field of metal fabrication Emporia possesses four
concerns. There is also one manufacturer of storage batteries, one soybean oil and
meal mill, one woodworking plant, two producers of building materials, and five
commercial printers.20
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The assessment goes on to evaluate each of the major towns within the Support Area. In
addition, there is a discussion of converting the existing factors to produce what is needed
for recovery, rather than what is necessarily currently produced. The report notes that
some factories currently produce lawnmowers, snow plows, aluminum doors, and many
other items that may not be necessary during an emergency. However, the high amount of
welding done at these factories ensures that they can turn out basic tools and parts as
necessary.21 This capability will aid in the rebuilding of the infrastructure and buildings
damaged by any nuclear attack. In addition to the manufacturing assets, the planning
extended to the number of evacuees expected. The planners estimated that as many as
two hundred seventy three thousand people may leave the Kansas City area for the
Support Area. Therefore they had a list of the major towns in the Support Area and the
number of evacuees they could be expected to house. For example, Atchison was
expected to house thirty three thousand whereas Doniphan was expected to house only
five thousand evacuees. The total number listed under all the towns added up to
approximately the same number as expected in the event of evacuation following a
nuclear attack.22 The details contained within the state plans appear complete, but do not
consider the behavior and emotions of the people involved. The planners assumed that
everyone would evacuate the Target Areas as instructed, in a neat and orderly manner.
The Support Areas would welcome the evacuees into their communities and share their
resources because it was for the good of the country. This completely ignored the blind
panic that most people would experience with a legitimate warning of an imminent
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nuclear attack on their location and the tendency of human beings to become territorial
and protective of limited resources during a crisis.
While much of the early material produced by the FCDA and OCD was for the
general public, the end of the fifties brought a change occurred. Specific groups were the
recipients of messages designed to help them in their unique circumstances. In addition,
the OEP and OCD recruited other federal agencies, like the United States Department of
Agriculture, to produce material for these targeted groups.

45

RURAL SURVIVAL PLANS
The geopolitical events of the early 1960s significantly influenced the actions of
the United States government and its citizens. This was the height of the Cold War, the
working relationship of President Kennedy and Soviet Premiere Khrushchev was ever
more strained as they faced off over the Berlin Wall and the missiles in Cuba. This
tension led to the proliferation of magazine articles, newspaper serials, and government
published materials all with the same goal: preparing the American public to survive a
nuclear war.
The OCD started targeting the agricultural community with information provided
by scientists from the United States Department of Agriculture. The information provided
to rural and agricultural communities was significantly different than that provided to the
general public. These groups were given technical and scientific information designed to
help them protect themselves, their livestock, and their crops. Information regarding
specific types of radiation that could be expected in fallout. The level of detail provided
was thought important so that farmers and livestock producers would understand the
necessity of correctly protecting their livestock, crops, and land.
As with other demographics, the government enlisted some popular media to
address the issue with farmers. These included a 1962 article in Successful Farming, a
1962 article in Nebraska Farmer, the 1961 article in LIFE magazine that pictured a farm
family sheltering with their livestock in their barn. In addition to the popular media, the
government produced a number of brochures, pamphlets, and Public Service
Announcements geared toward the rural population.
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In the days before ubiquitous large chain stores that pushed out locally owned
retailers, families living in rural areas lived differently than their urban counterparts. This
was particularly true for those that lived on farms and ranches. Thus the government
found a receptive audience in this constituency. Rural residents were used to growing and
canning their own food, storing large amounts of staple goods, taking less frequent trips
to town for shopping, and in general living a more self-reliant lifestyle. This population
was accustomed to their independence, fending for themselves, and taking care of their
own responsibilities. While the primary goal of the campaign was to prepare their
families and the secondary goal was to protect their livestock and crops, there was
another message. The tertiary message included in the survival information aimed at the
rural population was that following a nuclear attack, citizens may be isolated and without
governmental help. In addition, this population had other things to take into account if a
nuclear attack happened; they were caretakers of their livestock and land. The preparation
materials aimed at this population featured information and messages aimed to address
the unique interests of the rural citizen. These interests included protecting their family,
sheltering their livestock, and preserving the fertility of the land needed to feed and water
both.
The United States’ government had one goal following any nuclear attack: to get
the country up and running again. One of the ways to accomplish that feat was to protect
the food production areas, including livestock production and agricultural production.
One of the chief methods of determent against a nuclear attack from the Soviet Union
was to ensure that normal life in the United States would continue with little delay
following any attack. This included ensuring that food production faced little disruption.
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While the population could survive for a time on canned and stored goods, it was vital
that America’s farmers return to food and animal production as soon as possible. The
preparation efforts of the government to ensure the agricultural population and their
livestock and land would survive reflected that concern. A careful reading of the
materials shows that one of the biggest concerns was the protection of dairy cows. Dairy
cows were the focus of much attention for two reasons. First, the daily requirement of
infants and children for dairy milk had no viable substitute at the time. If the milk supply
was insufficient to meet the needs of the younger population, the effects would be felt for
their entire lifetime. Second, dairy milk was extremely susceptible to the effects of
absorbed radiation. Much of the material given to rural and agricultural populations
featured information about protecting dairy cows, placing their importance above all
other livestock species on the farm.
The fallout shelters for rural residents were very different than those of the urban
and suburban population. Many farm families, especially those in the Great Plains region,
already had storm shelters. These storm shelters might be in the basement of the house or
a separate root cellar dug into the ground equally distant from the house and the garden.
Regardless of where these shelters were physically located, they could expect to be
pressed into service as fallout shelters in the event of a nuclear attack. These shelters
already housed the excess garden produce canned by rural families and so it was an easier
feat to set them up with furniture and enough shelf stable food as recommended by civil
defense pamphlets.
The government utilized several avenues, including local agricultural extension
offices, to distribute several types of shelter plans that were uniquely suited for
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agricultural use. Although the plans featured farm buildings with built in fallout shelters,
they were specifically designed to be used daily for their primary agricultural purposes.
These buildings offered a few advantages over a fallout shelter in a root cellar or
basement. First, they were an extra farm building to be used daily as needed by the
farmer. Next with respect to the cattle bunker, the family and any staff would shelter with
their livestock. They would not need to risk their health or wellbeing to take care of their
stock; all were housed under one roof.
One of these plans was for a fallout shelter built on to a potato storage facility.1
For everyday use the storage facility held six thousand cwt. The term cwt equals one
hundred pounds, therefore six thousand cwt of potatoes is the equivalent of six hundred
thousand pounds of potatoes. The plans advised that this would normally be used to hold
seed potatoes. However, in the event of an emergency anyone sheltering in the adjacent
facility had access to six hundred thousand pounds of potatoes in addition to other shelter
goods. The potato storage facility featured two levels, with parking for trucks on both
levels, and the shelter on the lower level built into the hill. In fact, the protection factor of
the shelter increased if there was a truck parked above the shelter. Intended to protect up
to six people following an attack, the shelter measured approximately ten feet by eighteen
feet.2
Another of these plans was for a bunker style shelter designed primarily for cattle,
but easily converted to any type of livestock.3 In addition, the plans say that it may be
1
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converted to a rural community shelter for people with some modifications. This shelter
is designed to be built into a sloping hill in the pastures or fields where the animals are
grazing. That way the animals can be herded into the safety of the bunker with little
advance notice of a nuclear attack. The food and water should be pre-positioned, just like
in your family’s shelter. Depending on the width and length of the chosen shelter design,
up to sixty cattle could be safely housed for up to two weeks, as recommended by the
United States Department of Agriculture.4
Roberts Dairy Company, a major regional dairy company in Elkhorn, Nebraska,
built and tested a modified version of the bunker style cattle shelter. In 1963 they sent
thirty-five cows, a bull named Aristocrat, and two student workers underground for two
weeks to test the viability of their shelter. Built under a company farm, the shelter was
large enough to house two hundred cows, two bulls, and fifteen people to care for them.
Separate from the cow shelter, the human shelter had its own air filtration system. The
cows and bull weathered the two week test with little difficulty. The same cannot be said
of the student workers. Even though they had a two-way radio so they were not isolated
completely from the outside world and they had the chores associated with caring for the
livestock to occupy them, the two young men “complained about boredom and the
monotonous food.”5 Overall the experiment was deemed a success and proved a positive
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step in protecting the food chain in the event of a nuclear attack.6 This is particularly
important because dairy cows are the most vulnerable to contamination from nuclear
fallout and the most likely to transfer the fallout to the milk they produce.7
The information provided to the agricultural producers took many forms. One of
these was Farmer’s Bulletin No. 2107 distributed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
“Defense Against Radioactive Fallout on the Farm.” This bulletin reiterates the steps that
farmers and livestock producers should take to protect their products. Again, the
emphasis is on protecting dairy cows if a choice needs to be made, due to the
susceptibility of milk to radioactive contamination. Some of the information seems
contradictory. At one point the bulletin has the following line, “growing vegetables that
are exposed to heavy fallout may become highly radioactive.”8 However, a few lines
further into the paragraph the following line advises farmers that they may be able to save
their radioactive crops, “Most vegetables would be marketable, and should not be
destroyed without testing for radioactivity.”9
Another pamphlet provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture had an
additional bonus, a thirty second Public Service Announcement (PSA). “Your Livestock
Can Survive Fallout from Nuclear Attack” came as an eight page pamphlet and a PSA to
demonstrate the instructions found within its pages. The solemn voice narrating the
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commercial advises viewers that, “In any disaster your livestock need protection too.”10
At another point in the commercial the same announcer tells farmers, “In an emergency
shelter your livestock, then take shelter yourself.”11 The farmer demonstrated the various
techniques intoned by the announcer, including stacking hay bales along the exterior
walls of the barn to increase the protection factor from radiation and herding a cow into
the barn to protect it from fallout. In contrast to the commercial, the pamphlet listed
information on protecting chickens as well as the typical cows, the many ways to ensure
that adequate amounts of food and water were covered and protected from nuclear
fallout, and ways to convert typical farm buildings and storage facilities into improvised
shelters at the last minute to ensure that the maximum number of animals were protected
as well as possible. Included in the pamphlet was a set of specific instructions on what to
do “[i]f you receive sufficient fallout warning…” and “[i]f fallout warning gives you little
time…”12 The pamphlet does have some advice on protecting the family on the last page
of the brochure. Unlike the video version, the pamphlet urges that readers, “first provide
for your own safety and that of your family and neighbors. To do this, you may not be
able, at first, to take care of your livestock, your crops, and your land.”13
In June of 1963 the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
Office of Education produced a more formal basic Civil Defense educational program
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also aimed at rural residents. Officially the program was commissioned by the Federal
Extension Service and the United States Department of Agriculture, in cooperation with
the OCD. This program was designed for use by extension office agents to uniformly
instruct their local constituents in the basics of civil defense as it applied to their unique
environments. Covered in the program were the basics of nuclear attack, why rural
preparedness was necessary, the importance of a shelter and how to stock it, helping the
community, preparing to care for your livestock, feed, and crops, rural fire prevention,
and making a family survival plan. This educational effort plainly stated one of the
federal government’s main goals for producing so much Civil Defense material
specifically aimed at the rural population. Under the heading of “Why Rural
Preparedness” the following statement appeared, “Following any attack it would be
essential that farmers and other rural people survive, save breeding stock, decontaminate
and continue basic food production that would be vital to the country’s survival and
recovery.”14 That is the clear motivating factor behind the ongoing effort to convince the
rural population that they need to prepare to survive the dangers of nuclear fallout. No
giving up! Your country needed you and, more importantly, what you produced, to get
back up and running smoothly. The rest of the information included was similar to many
of the other brochures and pamphlets. Advice on building a safe shelter, or making a
facility that you currently have, safer from radioactive fallout, what to stock in your
shelter, and how to protect your livestock. This particular instructional effort did include
a new piece of information regarding protecting livestock. In addition to the usual

14

U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, What People Can Do
About Rural Civil Defense” U.S. Department of Agriculture (Washington D.C.: United States Government
Printing Office, 1963), 4.

53

entreaty to ensure that dairy cows received the most protected spots in the livestock
shelter, breeding stock should have the next best areas in the shelter. The protection of
good breeding stock was secondary only to the protection of dairy cows. A farmer’s
breeding stock was as important to his future as the land itself. Without breeding stock to
continue a robust and healthy herd or flock a farmer would have a bleak future. The herd
or flock would die out or worse, face inbreeding problems, and the farmer would have
survived the attacks only to lose the sustainability and value of his herd or flock. Any
leftover space should go to the rest of the animals.15
This was also one of the few Civil Defense produced items that discussed a very
important subject, fire prevention. In the event of a nuclear attack many populations were
potentially going to be isolated. The government did not want to acknowledge that fact,
but they came close in this section. If the government openly acknowledged that in the
event of a nuclear attack, populations may be on their own without governmental help, it
would acknowledge that the government was not in total control of the country’s
immediate reaction to a nuclear attack. The United States’ government had thus far built
themselves up to be the sole expert on all things nuclear. All information flowed from the
government or its agents. The most important idea that the government sought to convey
was that through early preparation the people of the United States and their government
could survive a nuclear attack. If the government could not maintain control after an
attack, chaos could reign. This section listed various steps that rural residents could take
to help prevent fires. Among the suggestions listed were removing fire hazards from
around and inside buildings, having tools like fire extinguishers, shovels, and water on
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hand at all times, and providing a large body of water on the farm earmarked for fighting
fires. In addition, neighbors should form their own firefighting teams to ensure that they
could handle emergencies on their own. This is as close as the government comes to
acknowledging that local services probably will not be available and people might be on
their own for some time when it comes to facing life after a nuclear attack.16
Protecting fertile and productive cropland was another issue that the federal
government thought important to the continued survival of the population of the United
States. As with the dairy milk, the growth of fresh food would prove important to the
long term survival of the United States. The extent to which the nuclear fallout
contaminated farmland in the agricultural areas was of grave concern to the federal
government. There were items produced for farmers that addressed this issue. The United
States Department of Agriculture addressed these concerns by producing a
comprehensive report and a pamphlet that offered a greatly abridged version of the
information contained in the report. Both addressed soil, crops, and how fallout would
affect them. Both agreed that in areas with light fallout, farming would hardly be
affected. However, if an area experienced early and heavy fallout, agricultural production
could face challenges for years to come. The eight page pamphlet does not do justice to
the subject matter covered in the full report. One interesting note though, there is a
disclaimer in bold print on the second page of the pamphlet that reads, “This publication
discusses radioactive-contamination conditions that may occur as a result of heavy fallout
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from massive attack. The information given here is not related in any way to conditions
that result from distant, controlled testing of nuclear devices.”17
An expansive report from the Agricultural Research Service, produced in 1962,
included very detailed information for agricultural producers about virtually everything
that one would need to plan for a nuclear attack or determine when it was safe to come
out following one. The first section provides the details of a potential nuclear attack.
Included are the area of destruction, fallout formation, area of severe fallout, gamma and
beta radiation, hazards of various types of radiation, and a very detailed account of how
to figure out the intensity of radiation in your area and its time of decay. The latter also
features a table listing the variable involved to help illustrate the method. The next
section explains the amount of protection provided from various types of shelters, again
complete with pictorial examples. Another section addresses the unique situation of farm
families, and the need to care for livestock. They are faced with the conflicting desires to
protect themselves and their livestock at the same time. While urban and suburban shelter
dwellers would not face this dilemma, every farm family would inevitably need to
balance the health and safety of their family with that of their livestock. By extension,
this decision will have ramification long after they emerge from the shelter. If they
emerge too early to protect their livestock they risk their lives. If they do not protect their
stock and land sufficiently, they will not have anything to emerge to. As the report states,
“Even during an early period following fallout, farm families will be faced with the
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necessity of doing such farm chores as caring for livestock.”18 Further down the page is a
table that breaks down how long after a nuclear explosion a person could work outside
per day without getting a deadly dose of radiation.19 For example, in the second twentyfour hours after a nuclear explosion a person could only work outside their shelter for one
hour. Compare that to the fifteenth through the twenty-first days when a person could
work outside their shelter for up to four hours per day without getting too much exposure
to radiation.20
The section specifically mentioning livestock furnished much more detailed
information about protection for animals, their food and water. In addition to the usual
stuff about dairy cows, there was information on how to protect animals that are unable to
be sheltered in buildings. The pamphlet states that “[a]nimals that are not placed in a barn
or under a roof might, if possible, be placed under trees or where they are covered to
some extent. It is better to keep animals alive on contaminated feed and water than to let
them die from starvation.”21 If a farmer is unable to protect his animals from fallout the
report offers the following advice for cows, “If practical, they should be thoroughly
washed off as soon as it is possible for the farmer to stay outside for a limited time.”22 In
addition, scientists conducted a study to determine the amount of exposure that specific
types of shelter would provide to the various domestic farm animals. The most effective
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type of shelter would be the basement-type barn with a loft full of hay and the least
effective type of shelter would be a tight wooden barn. If no shelter were provided for
animals cattle, hogs, and sheep suffer approximately the same number of deaths based on
exposure to roentgens. They suffered thirty percent death rate at five hundred roentgens,
one hundred percent death at both one thousand and three thousand roentgens. However,
chickens were the exception with ten percent death rate at five hundred roentgens, sixty
four percent at one thousand, and one hundred percent death at three thousand
roentgens.2324
This page also included a mortality chart that listed various domestic farm
animals and how long they would survive if left exposed to different doses of radiation.
This chart allowed farmers to decide how likely their animals were to die given the
duration and amount of radiation their area was expected to experience. It is interesting to
note that poultry apparently tolerate radiation exposure better than most other domestic
animals. Their midlethal dose of radiation, the radiation dose that you would expect half
of your animals to die within thirty days, is nine hundred roentgens; while cattle have a
midlethal dose of five hundred fifty roentgens. 25 The report continues with more on
poultry, including that since most poultry have shelter to protect the flock from predators
and the environment, poultry stands a better chance than most other farm raised livestock
of being protected from radioactive fallout. In addition, since chickens eat a commercial
feed product, their food would be safe from contamination due to being stored in large
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bags inside the barn. The result is that following a nuclear attack poultry would be the
least likely contaminated meat source available for the surviving population.26
One of the most interesting and unique sections of this report covered the dangers
of internal radiation poisoning. The key way to get internal radiation is from eating or
drinking a contaminated item. Initially the process would be straight forward; a person
would eat fruit, vegetables, or grains that had particles of fallout on it. Eventually though,
the radioactive fallout that contaminated the soil would be absorbed into the plants. Then
animals and the contaminated animals eaten by humans either ingested the plants or
humans would eat the contaminated plants directly. In both cases radiation entered the
food chain, causing illness and probable death at every stage. This is crucial information
to disseminate to the general public so that they do not ingest contaminated food or water.
The danger would be masses of people surviving the initial attack only to disregard the
dangers of fallout contamination and dying after the attack from internal radiation
poisoning.
There is a detailed section on radioactive iodine and radioactive strontium. These
two isotopes were critical because they were the most common isotopes to contaminate
fresh milk. Due to the importance of milk and milk products for the nutritional health of
babies and children and the quantities required to satisfy that demand, scientists had
extensively studied milk’s radioactivity and the half-life of that radioactivity. The
extreme risk of radiation entering the fresh milk supply of the United States was why
there was such an emphasis in the literature.The emphasis in the literature was due to the
fact that the government wanted to ensure that the importance of the shelter and
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protection of dairy cows and their food and water supplies was understood by the rural
population. Secondary to the dairy cows, the safekeeping strong breeding stock was the
next priority. To this end, the danger of strontium ninety and the difference between it
and strontium eighty-nine was discussed in some of the literature. Strontium ninety was a
radiation with a half-life of twenty-eight years. In other words, it lost half of its potency
every twenty-eight years. This is in contrast to strontium eighty-nine which has a half-life
of only fifty-three days. This meant that every fifty-three days the strontium eighty-nine
lost one half of its potency. Both of these chemicals are important to fresh milk
production because the chemical in the soil behaves much like calcium and is absorbed
through the plant via the animal eating it. In addition, the strontium is secreted in milk
and collects or is stored in bones. Tests revealed that children are sensitive to the
radioactivity present in strontium. Since children drink a larger proportion of milk than
adults and are more sensitive to the strontium, it is crucial that all effort is made to
prevent it from entering the milk supply in the first place. The result of children with
exposure to high doses of radioactive milk is an increased rate of bone cancer.27
Another section that introduced new information into the discussion concerned
the croplands that formed the foundation of so many agricultural families’ homesteads.
This section included use of the contaminated land and a table for determining that use by
strontium ninety levels, calcium levels, and type of crop. If one’s cropland had low levels
of calcium pre-fallout, then the land was less likely to retain strontium ninety, and pass it
on to foods grown on that land through the root system of the plants. Another
consideration was the calcium level of the plants; potatoes and corn had lower levels of
27
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calcium and would absorb less strontium ninety than leafy green vegetables which are
higher in calcium. Contaminated irrigation water would not appreciably add to strontium
levels. Most of the strontium would be diluted by the water, with a large portion of the
remaining being absorbed by the earthen banks and sides of the water source.28
The reclamation of contaminated croplands and grazing fields could take years.
The methods to decontaminate valuable agricultural lands varied from removing the
ground cover and crops to removal of the entire topsoil layer. The effectiveness and cost
of the latter method makes it questionable for large scale reclamation projects. For areas
on a grander scale, the method of deep plowing seemed more practical, if not as
comprehensive. The deep plowing method aimed to turn the contaminated topsoil as
much as eighteen inches under the surface. This would be deep enough to allow most
crops to be grown without fear of the root systems reaching the contamination. There
were a couple of major problems with the deep plowing method. First, the idea that one
could plow under all of the topsoil without it mixing with the soil it was pulling up to
replace it was not credible. Second, the soil that replaced the once fertile topsoil would
not necessarily be as productive. 29
The appendices contribute to the usefulness of this report. While not technically
part of the appendices, the glossary is placed between the last page of the report and the
first appendix. However, the three page glossary is extremely thorough. It is a short
primer on all things nuclear, not only the common terms like “contamination” and
“shelter,” but the more obscure terms like “curie” and “equivalent residual dose.”
Appendix A explains how to measure fallout radiation. Included are good pictures of a
28
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dosimeter, a machine that tracks an individual’s radiation exposure, and a Geiger counter,
a machine that detects and measures radioactivity in a specific area. Appendix B lists
various building types and their protection factors. Appendix C features several different
fallout shelters appropriate for agricultural use. Included in this appendix are two
different designs that combine shelters for both the animals and the people that must care
for them. These designs are similar in nature to the potato storage shelter and cattle
shelter previously mentioned released by the United States Department of Agriculture.
One design is a forty cow dairy barn with built in family shelter and feed storage. This
design was intended to be used as a barn and milking facility during normal times and as
a shelter following a nuclear attack. 30 The dual purpose made it a better investment than
a designated use shelter only.
This report is a concise, complete compendium of information for farmers and
other agricultural producers. If the information is studied and used to prepare the
homestead for possible nuclear attack, the chances of survival would greatly increase for
rural families and their livestock. The only other thing that would need to be added was a
listing of the recommended types and amounts of items to store in one’s shelter.
Considering those lists were available at the same extension agent that distributed this
report, farmers likely received both.
The tone of all the information aimed at rural populations emphasized
preparedness and self-sufficiency. More than any other population in the United States,
the rural and agricultural population had a high probability of being isolated following a
nuclear attack. Rather than wait for the government to help them or provide them with
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shelter, the information aimed at this population stressed taking care of themselves and
their responsibilities.
The information provided by the government provided agricultural producers with
scientific information that was designed to help them prioritize their preparation and
survival efforts. The first line of recommendations was shelters large enough for prized
stock and their family under one roof readied ahead of any disaster. If that advice was not
followed, then they offered suggestions for preparing last minute shelters. One of the
most important things that the government provided though was undiluted information.
More than any other population, the government treated this population as a
partner in the massive effort of getting the country up and running again. As such, the
government needed their help to continue to provide a valuable service and product even
after the attack. To do this, the farmers and agricultural producers needed to have the
information to make the best decisions. This included the reiteration of the need to
protect the dairy cows, first and foremost. This was of paramount importance to the
government, so that information was up front and central in all the information provided
to rural populations. The protection of the food production mechanism was vitally
important to the continuity of the United States following a nuclear attack. Without fresh
food coming from farms and ranches, any population that managed to survive a nuclear
attack in their fallout shelters, would not survive beyond the length of their canned food
stash.
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES TO PREPARATION
There were many similarities in the preparations that the federal government
published for the various target audiences. After all there were some commonalities
between the urban, suburban, and rural populations. All demographics were urged to
prepare shelters in advance of any possible attacks, this included stocking them with
adequate supplies. Children’s introduction to the possibility of nuclear attack and what to
do in case of one was a nationwide effort.
Fallout shelters were a previously unknown reality that all Americans became
familiar with. Whether they actually built them or just studied the plans, people could not
help but be aware of them. In 1961, following President Kennedy’s speech in July and
letter in the September 15th edition of LIFE magazine urging the American people to
prepare, there were twenty two million copies of Family Fallout Shelter distributed.1 This
is equivalent to approximately twelve percent of the total population of the United States
in 1960.2 That does not account for the millions who planned their shelters on their own,
through plans in their copy of LIFE, or through their extension agent.
Another commonality across demographics was the directive to stock up on food,
water, and other supplies so that one could stay sheltered for at least two weeks following
a nuclear attack. There were many different types of lists distributed. One of the most
popular was the “Grandma’s Pantry” list. Printed on paper shaped to resemble a black
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soup pot, these lists and the accompanying matching displays were an attempt to link the
current efforts with the previous generations’ overall preparedness. The government even
produced a freestanding display that invoked images of elderly women putting home
canned goods on shelves to help feed their families and stave off hunger.3
The educational effort aimed toward children was another commonality of all
localities. Bert the Turtle was universally marketed to children. The coloring book and
cartoon starring the character provide further evidence of this marketing. In addition,
large school systems provided their students with dog tags for easier identification of the
bodies. In some rural areas the schools themselves were fallout shelters. Built entirely
underground, the elementary school in Artesia, New Mexico doubled as a community
fallout shelter. The cafeteria featured a sign that read, “Normal Conditions: Food Storage.
Fallout Conditions: Morgue.”4 This was in addition to some schools actually using the
FCDA’s Survival under Atomic Attack as text for fourth grade students.5
There were many ways in which the preparations for the various demographic
groups differed. The most obvious was during the Eisenhower administration’s push for
mass evacuations. While the urban and some of the suburban populace was being
prepared to evacuate their homes due to their proximity to Target Areas, the rest of the
suburban and all of the rural populace was being prepared to host all the refugees. In
general, the more rural a location, the less likely the area was to be targeted. This
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changed in the mid to late 1960s with the placement of the Minuteman missiles in many
rural locations. However, for the scope of this study the Target Areas were largely in
heavily populated metropolitan areas or those areas with strategically located military
bases.
Another major difference in the preparations that was unique to the rural
population was the need to protect livestock, feed, and other agricultural resources. In
addition, rural populations were facing the possibility of being isolated from outside help
for at least a short period of time. Several of the government provided preparation
materials stressed the ability to take care of themselves or band with neighbors to help
each other out.
Due to the unique qualifications and needs of the rural and agricultural
communities, the information provided to them was different than that given to the
general public. The United States Department of Agriculture provided technical and
scientific information directly related to the protection of livestock, crops, and land so
that the rural and agricultural communities would be equipped to survive a nuclear attack.
Their survival was crucial to the rebuilding of the United States following an attack.
Survivors needed to have healthy and safe food to eat when they emerged from the
shelters.
Rural families needed to protect their valuable resources for several reasons. First
and foremost because they were possible sources of food and other sustenance for the
family following a nuclear attack. While many families living in rural areas were
accustomed to stocking up on food items and other supplies due to their isolated
locations, following an attack restocking would be virtually impossible for some time.
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This meant that they needed to consider their livestock and crops as potential sources of
food to keep themselves and their neighbors alive until life returned to normal.
Another reason was the government’s grave concern about protecting the food
production system so that the United States could get up and running as soon as possible
after an attack. Provided the nuclear attack did not significantly impact the producer’s
local area, they would be tasked with keeping food production output functioning at as
close to pre-attack levels as possible. The government was counting on rural populations
to help them return the country to normal operating conditions as quickly as possible to
reinforce the legitimate United States government.
Finally, the resources represented financial assets that the family owned and
needed to protect. Many families that own agricultural land have done so for generations
and consider it a family legacy. These families pass the land and business down to their
children and grandchildren. To survive the nuclear attack, yet lose their entire herd or
have all their land be contaminated for decades by nuclear fallout would be catastrophic
for them not only on a business level, but a personal one as well. The bloodlines of their
stock needed to be carefully protected to ensure their family’s heritage would be
protected. They would have the added bonus of being able to offer their breeding stock to
help repopulate the areas that had been decimated by radioactive fallout.

CONCLUSION
The history of Civil Defense took many turns between Presidents Roosevelt and
Kennedy. Each President determined how he wanted to steer the direction of Civil
Defense preparedness while in office. Roosevelt appointed his wife Eleanor as one of the
advisors and felt strongly in the idea of Civil Defense preparedness for the American
people. The buildup of the German war machine and the advent of World War II
convinced the American people of the appropriateness of those actions. However, with
his death in 1945, President Truman took over. Truman believed that with the end of
World War II Civil Defense preparedness had outlived its usefulness. Truman had been
complacent in the idea that the United States was the only country with an atomic
weapon. Following the successful detonation of the Soviet Union’s first atomic weapon
in 1949, Truman changed his mind. With Eisenhower’s election the focus shifted from
preparing shelters, to mass evacuations for the first time. In large part due to the
Eisenhower administration’s mandate to significantly improve the interstate highway
system. The administration did not want to divert any money from its primary mission of
expanding and improving the highway system, so they found a way to incorporate the
highway system into Civil Defense. Despite many experts advising that mass evacuations
were grossly improbable, the Eisenhower administration stuck to its guns. The focus
shifted again with President Kennedy’s election. Kennedy’s tenure in office featured
heightened tensions with the Soviet Union over a number of issues including the Berlin
Wall and Soviet missiles in Cuba. President Kennedy made a number of personal appeals
to the American people, urging them to prepare themselves for nuclear war. This is
arguably the time when the world came closest to nuclear war.
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Urban and suburban populations shared many of the same preparations. Although
urban populations had access to more public shelters, public shelters were found in all
sectors of American life. The focus of suburban preparations was generally the home
shelter, either in the basement or the backyard. The government offered home equity and
improvement loans to facilitate the building of these home shelters. Introduced in the late
1950s, mass evacuation plans were a complete one hundred and eighty degree change in
preparations. People needed to have their supplies ready to go on a moment’s notice and
to know which sector they lived and worked in and the corresponding evacuation routes.
Rural populations had a much more complicated time when preparing for survival. The
population in agricultural regions had not only themselves and their families to think of
but hundreds, if not thousands of heads of livestock to protect as well. Realistically they
knew that it would be impossible to protect all the livestock they had. However,
preparations needed to be made to protect as many important producers as possible. After
all, the livestock and crops represented the financial future of these families.
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